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COMMENTS 
CAVEAT VENDITOR IN MARYLAND CONDOMINIUM 
SALES: CASES AND LEGISLATION IMPOSING 
IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN SALES OF 
RESIDENTIAL CONDOMINIUMS 
The real estate market in the past decade has witnessed the in-
creasing popularity of residential condominiums. The maze of 
interests involved in condominium development, sales, and own-
ership has prompted the General Assembly to enact stringent 
warranties to protect individual purchasers. This comment dis-
cusses the historical basis for these warranties and examines, 
from the perspective of a recent Maryland case, the complexity 
of litigation arising from breach of warranties in condominium 
construction. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Independent developments have occurred recently in the law of 
implied warranties attached to residential real estate and the law of 
condominium ownership. The General Assembly has determined that 
individual home buyers merit statutory warranty protection because 
the average purchaser lacks the expertise to identify construction de-
fects. When warranty claims arise in a residential condominium, how-
ever, the varied property interests existing in a condominium 
complicate the determination of who deserves warranty protection. 
Staifish Condominium Association v. Yorkridge Service Corpora-
tion, 1 a 1983 Court of Appeals of Maryland decision, illustrates the 
complexity of condominium warranty litigation. In that case, the court 
held that a foreclosure buyer of an incomplete condominium project is 
liable to unit purchasers for breach of implied warranties regardless of 
whether he performed the actual construction of the project. The court 
rejected the vendor's disclaimer that failed to comply with the require-
ments of the Maryland statutory warranty provisions. In holding that a 
council of condominium unit owners had standing to sue for defects in 
the common areas, the court determined that any one or more of the 
unit owners was entitled to recover all the damages proven to exist in 
those areas. 
This comment will use the Staifish decision as a framework to ex-
amine the Maryland law of implied warranties regarding condominium 
sales. In addition, it will discuss recent amendments to the Maryland 
Condominium Act and suggest their influence on future litigation. 
I. 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1983). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Retreat of Caveat Emptor 
Originally, under English and American common law, self-reli-
ance on the part of buyers was compulsory: the doctrine of caveat 
emptor dominated the sale of both real and personal property. As 
enunciated in a seventeenth century English decision,2 a seller made no 
warranties unless he made a separate promise at the time of contracting 
that his wares were, in fact, what he described them to be. A mere 
description gave rise to no liability, as "everyone in selling his wares 
will affirm that his wares are good . . . yet if he does not warrant them 
to be so, it is no cause of action."3 
The first American decision to adopt this reasoning was Seixas v. 
Woods, 4 an 1804 decision by the Court for the Correction of Errors of 
New York. The Seixas court held that a seller who advertised brazi-
letto wood but delivered peachum was not liable to the buyer in the 
absence of an express promise that the wood was actually braziletto. 
Insensitivity toward the plight of buyers characterized American com-
merciallaw decisions until the end of the nineteenth century.5 
The first attack on the doctrine of caveat emptor came from Eng-
land in Jones v. Just.6 The Jones court held that in certain limited in-
stances when a buyer had no opportunity to inspect goods for which he 
contracted, and relied on the judgment and skill of the manufacturer, 
there arose an implied warranty of fitness and merchantable quality.7 
Six years later, the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited the Jones 
case with approval, but declined to follow it on the facts presented. 8 
Meanwhile, courts in other jurisdictions adopted Jones in cases where 
buyers clearly had no opportunity to discover defects at the time of 
sale.9 
2. Chandelor v. Lopus, [1603] 79 Eng. Rep. 3. 
3. Id at 4. 
4. 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. 1804). For early Maryland cases in accord with Seixas, see 
Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99 (1869); Hyatt v. Boyle, 5 G. & J. 110 (1833); Johnston 
v. Cope, 3 H. & J. 89 (1810). 
5. E.g., Hargous v. Stone, 1 Seld. 73 (N.Y. 1851) (exhibit of a sample of cotton sheet-
ing not sufficient to create a warranty that the bulk of goods were of the same 
quality). See generally R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SALES § 54 
(1970) (discussing the history of warranty liability in the sale of goods). 
6. (1868) 3 Q.B. 197; see also IS. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING THE SALES OF 
GooDs (2d. ed 1920) (discussing the English rule as announced in Jones v. Just). 
7. Id at 202. 
8. Rice v. Forsyth, 41 Md. 389, 402-05 (1874) (insufficient evidence that the machine 
purchased failed to perform as would be ordinarily expected or that purchaser 
made known to the seller his particular needs. Id. at 407-08). 
9. See, e.g., White v. Miller, 71 N.Y. 118, 131-32 (1877) (sale of cabbage seed gave 
rise to an implied warranty that the seed would produce that particular variety of 
cabbage); Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552, 561-63 (1860) (manufacturer of circular 
saws may be liable for implied warranty when there is reason to impute knowl-
edge of their defects to him by reason of his manufacturing); Wolcott v. Mount, 36 
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Buyers of goods eventually gained statutory protection by the 
widespread adoption of the Uniform Sales Act (Act), 10 and later the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 11 Under the warranty provisions 
of these uniform acts, 12 sellers of goods incur warranty obligations im-
posed by law, absent a clear agreement between the parties to the con-
trary. The warranties affected only sales of goods, however, creating a 
dichotomy between personalty and realty sales. The traditional rule of 
caveat emptor remained undisturbed in real estate sales well into the 
twentieth century. Indeed, one eminent scholar unequivocally stated in 
1920 that "[t]he doctrine of caveat emptor so far as the title of personal 
property is concerned, is very nearly abolished, but in the law of real 
estate it is still in full force." 13 
In Milkton v. French, 14 the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld 
the doctrine of caveat emptor in sales of realty. The court held that in 
the absence of fraudulent misrepresentation or evidence of custom or 
agreement to the contrary, the vendor of real estate fully protected him-
self from liability for construction defects by not entering into an ex-
press warranty of quality. 15 Subsequent decisions 16 followed Mi/kton 
because "[i]t [was] settled in Maryland, as in most other jurisdictions, 
that there are no implied warranties in the sale of real estate." 17 
As in the law governing the sale of goods, the English courts were 
the first to find exceptions to the rigid application of caveat emptor in 
real estate sales. In Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd, 18 where a pur-
chaser contracted to buy a partially completed house, the court found 
N.J.L. 262 (1873) (seller impliedly warrants that turnip seed furnished is the vari-
ety requested by buyer). 
10. The Uniform Sales Act, drafted by Professor Samuel Williston, was modeled on 
the English Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Viet. c.7l (1893). Between 1907 and 1941, 
the Act was adopted by 34 states and the District of Columbia. NoRDSTROM, 
supra note 5, § 3. The Act has been superseded by Article 2 of the UCC. 
ll. For a brief history of the UCC and its revisions, see UCC xxv-xvi ( 1978) report 
nos. l-3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC (1978). The UCC has 
been adopted, in whole or in part, by every state, the District of Columbia, and 
the Virgin Islands. /d. at xxiii-iv. 
12. The implied warranty provisions of the Uniform Sales Act were set out in UNIF. 
SALES ACT§§ 14-16, l U.L.A. 207-308 (1950). Although§ 16 provided an im-
plied warranty in a sale by sample, UCC § 2-313 considers a sale by sample as an 
express warranty. R. NoRDSTROM, supra note 5, § 74, at 230 n.47. The UCC 
implied warranty provisions are set forth in §§ 2-314 to 2-316. 
13. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 926 (1920 ed.) 
14. 159 Md. 126, 150 A. 28 (1930). 
15. /d. at 136-37, 150 A. at 33. 
16. See Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958); Gilbert Constr. Co. v. 
Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957); Berger v. Burkolf, 200 Md. 561,92 A.2d 
376 (1952); if. Gaybis v. Palm, 201 Md. 78, 93 A.2d 269 (1952) (contractor under 
implied obligation to perform the work for which he contracted with skill and 
care). But see Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale o/ Realty, 18 Mo. L. REv. 332 
(1958) (urging adoption of implied warranties in the sale of mass-produced 
homes). 
17. Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 476, 147 A.2d 223, 225 (1958). 
18. [1931]2 K.B. ll3, 117. 
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an implied warranty that the structure, when complete, would be habit-
able. The Miller court based its decision on the buyer's inability to 
protect himself by inspection at the time of contracting and his neces-
sary reliance on the superior knowledge and skill of the builder. 19 
It was not until 1957 that an American court expressly adopted the 
Ml1/er rule, pronouncing it "salutary and based on sound legal reason-
ing."20 In Vanderschrier v. Aaron,21 the Court of Appeals of Ohio held 
that the purchaser of a partially completed house was entitled to an 
implied warranty that the house would be completed in a workmanlike 
manner. Accordingly, it found that improperly connected sewer lines 
that caused sewage to enter the home constituted a breach of warranty. 
In both Mtller and Vanderschrier, the courts focused on the reli-
ance of a purchaser necessarily placed on a builder when he contracted 
to buy an incomplete structure. The early cases following these deci-
sions distinguished between the sales of homes under construction and 
those completed at the time of contracting. 22 Later cases abandoned 
this distinction and extended the Miller rule to sales of completed resi-
dential realty.23 These later decisions acknowledged that the consider-
ations that supported implied warranties in the sale of partially 
completed houses, that is, reliance upon the seller and the inability of 
the buyer to protect himself, applied equally in the sale of newly com-
pleted houses. 24 
The growth of mass development housing prompted a reexamina-
tion of the distinctions between sales of goods and sales of realty. In 
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. ,25 for example, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey found that the buyers of mass development homes were no 
better able to protect themselves from latent structural defects than 
purchasers of automobiles were able to protect themselves from 
mechanical defects.26 Comparing the sale of mass-produced housing to 
the mass marketing of automobiles, the Schipper court found that the 
19. Id at 121. 
20. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 343, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (1957). 
21. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957). 
22. This distinction led to absurd results. Compare Rappich v. Alterrnatt, 106 Ohio 
App. 282, 151 N.E.2d 253 (1957) (buyer who signed sales contract on or about the 
date that construction was completed was not entitled to recover for breach of 
warranty) with Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All. E.R. 390 (buyer who 
purchased when construction was complete except for door knobs, electrical fix-
tures, and driveway was entitled to warranty protection). Rappich was decided by 
the same court that decided Vanderschrier. 
23. E.g., Carpenter v Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy v. 
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 
70, 207 A.2d 314 ( 1965). 
24. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 82, 388 P.2d 399, 400 (1964). See gener-
ally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 
14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961) (tracing early judicial attempts to circumvent the 
harsh results of caveat emptor in the post-World War II housing market). 
25. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). 
26. Id at 90, 207 A.2d at 325. 
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pertinent, overriding policy considerations were the same.27 Conse-
quently, the court applied the doctrine it had announced in Henningsen 
v. Bloomfield Motors, 28 where a breach of a common law warranty of 
merchantability was the basis for a manufacturer's liability for injury 
caused by a defective automobile.29 With the Schipper decision, the 
doctrine of caveat emptor was fast becoming an anachronism in the 
modem real estate market. 
Maryland courts declined to extend a common law doctrine of im-
plied warranties into real estate sales. Twice in the late 1960's, the 
court of appeals noted with approval the trend in other jurisdictions 
toward adopting implied warranties, but requested the legislature to act 
upon this matter of public policy.30 The General Assembly responded 
in 1970 by creating four statutory warranties in the sale of new im-
proved realty.31 These provisions warrant that the structure is: (1) free 
from faulty materials; (2) constructed according to sound engineering 
standards; (3) constructed in a workmanlike manner; and ( 4) fit for 
habitation.32 These warranties, which are limited in application to 
newly constructed private dwelling units, and fixtures and structures 
that are made a part thereof, 33 run from the vendors34 of new improved 
realty to the original purchasers. 35 
In the same year that the General Assembly enacted the Maryland 
warranty provisions, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
27. ld at 91-92, 207 A.2d at 325. 
28. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
29. Schipper, 44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325. 
30. Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968). The Allen court, which 
cited cases from other jurisdictions that found implied warranties in the sale of 
realty, stated, "We think that while there is some merit in the newer view ... 
such a change should be made by the legislature." ld at 398, 243 A.2d at 517; see 
Thomas v. Cryer, 251 Md. 725, 248 A.2d 795 (1969) (per curiam). The court 
quoted its call for legislative action in Allen, but followed that case because the 
legislature had not acted. /d. at 727, 248 A.2d at 796. 
31. 1970 Md. Laws 151 (codified as amended at Mo. REAL PROP. CoDE ANN.§ 10-
203 (1981)). 
32. Mo. REAL PROP. CoDE ANN.§ 10-203(a)(l)-(4) (1981). In the case of a dwelling 
completed at the time of delivery of the deed to the purchaser, the warranties 
expire one year after delivery of the deed or the taking of possession by a pur-
chaser. If the dwelling was not complete at the time of delivery of the deed, the 
warranties expire one year after completion or possession by the purchaser. Any 
action arising under the warranties must be brought within two years after the 
defect was or should have been discovered or within two years after the expiration 
of the warranty. Id § 10-204. 
33. ld § 10-20l(b). 
34. "Vendor" means any person engaged in the business of erecting or otherwise cre-
ating an improvement on realty, or to whom a completed improvement has been 
granted for resale in the course of his business. ld § 10-20l(e). 
35. ld § 10-20l(c). The statute's protection is limited to "original purchasers"; thus, 
subsequent purchasers enjoy no statutory warranty protection. /d. The court of 
appeals found that the statutory warranties place "an imposing burden on ven-
dors." Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 718-19, 399 A.2d 883, 890 
(1979). 
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Uniform State Laws began drafting the Uniform Land Transactions 
Act (UL T A), a model act designed to reform real estate transactions 
law.36 The ULTA includes a warranty provision37 similar to those in 
the Maryland statute.38 The official comment to the ULTA warranty 
provision indicates, however, that the drafters contemplated wider ap-
plication than did the Maryland legislature. The ULT A warranties are 
implied in the sale of used, as well as new, and commercial, as well as 
residential, real estate.39 The commissioners noted that the implied 
warranty provision is "perhaps the most important example of the 
modernization of real estate law by this Act."40 
B. The JJevelopment of Condominium Law 
While the law of warranties in real property sales was undergoing 
transition, new concepts of real property ownership were evolving in 
the form of condominium law. The Maryland Horizontal Property Act 
was originally enacted in 1963,41 and has since undergone extensive 
revision.42 Under the Maryland statute, each owner in a condominium 
holds a fee simple individual interest in his unit and a fee simple joint 
interest in the common elements as a tenant in common with the other 
unit owners.43 The unit owner's undivided percentage interest in the 
common elements attaches to the unit and cannot be severed by sale, 
subdivision, or consolidation.44 For most purposes, the unit owner's 
36. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 539-714 (1980). 
37. ULTA § 2-309, 13 U.L.A. 609-12 (1980). The ULTA was approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August 1975. Id. 
at 539. 
38. The UL T A implies the following warranties: ( 1) suitability for ordinary use; (2) 
freedom from defective materials; (3) construction in accordance with applicable 
law and sound engineering and construction standards; (4) and in a workmanlike 
manner. ULTA § 2-309, 13 U.L.A. 609-12 (1980). For the Maryland statutory 
warranties, see supra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
39. ULTA § 2-309, 13 U.L.A. 610-11 comment 1 (1980). 
40. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 539, 541 Commissioners Prefatory note (1980). This sentiment 
had been expressed several years earlier in the 1963 revision of Professor Willis-
ton's treatise on contracts. In a retreat from the earlier position that implied war-
ranties were nonexistent in real estate sales, the revised edition urged general 
acceptance of the "enlightened approach," releasing the sale of new homes from 
the doctrine of caveat emptor. 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS§ 926A (3d ed. 1963 & Supp. 1983); cf. S. WILLISTON, supra note 13, 
§ 926 (implied warranties do not exist in real estate transactions). 
41. 1963 Md. Laws 387 (originally codified at Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 21, §§ 117-41 
(1963)). This Act was recodified at Mo. REAL PROP. CoDE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -
127 (1974). In 1974, this Act was repealed and reenacted at id. §§ 11-101 to -128. 
42. For an historical discussion of the Act and its revisions, see REPORT OF THE CoN-
DOMINIUM REVISION COMMITTEE OF THE REAL PROPERTY PLANNING AND ZoN-
ING SECTION OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, reprinted in MD. 
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. (1974 & Supp. 1980) (beginning of title 11). 
43. Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § ll-l07(a) (1981); see also 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 334, 
335 (1979) (unit owners as tenants in common must unanimously agree on actions 
affecting the common elements absent a statutory provision to the contrary). 
44. Andrews v. City of Greenbelt, 293 Md. 69, 80,441 A.2d 1064, 1071 (1982). 
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interests in the common elements and in his particular unit constitute a 
single parcel of property.45 
The general management of a condominium is handled by a coun-
cil of unit owners.46 These councils or associations are legal entities 
and may be incorporated as a nonstock corporation, or may be unin-
corporated.47 Their powers include the management and maintenance 
of the common elements of the condominium for the benefit of the unit 
owners.48 
The typical condominium thus embraces two distinct forms of 
ownership, one individual and one joint. The joint tenancy in the com-
mon elements is managed by a third entity, the council, for the benefit 
of the joint tenants. Because of these varied interests, traditional con-
cepts of privity and standing often pose threshold questions that must 
be resolved by a court before it can analyze the merits of a claim. In 
addition, courts and legislatures tend to treat condominiums as a hy-
brid of real and personal property.49 These pre-packaged units of liv-
ing space bear little resemblance to the unique parcels of English and 
American countryside that spawned traditional concepts of caveat 
emptor and specific performance of sales contracts. Recent amend-
ments to the Maryland Condominium Act50 have provided legislative 
resolution to some of these issues, but judicial application will be clari-
fied only as cases arise. 
III. IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN CONDOMINIUM SALES 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland analyzed the statutory war-
ranty provisions as applied to condominium sales in Staljish Condomin-
ium Association v. Yorkridge Service Corporation.51 This case illus-
45. /d. at 77, 441 A.2d at 1069. 
46. MD. REAL. PROP. CODE ANN.§ ll-109(a) (1981). "The affairs of a condominium 
[are] governed by a council of unit owners which, even if unincorporated, consti-
tute[s] a legal entity for all purposes. The council ... shall be comprised of all 
unit owners." /d. The responsibilities of the council are generally delegated to a 
board of directors, officers, managing agent, or some other person as provided for 
by the condominium bylaws. /d. 
47./d. § ll-109(d). 
48. /d.§ 11-108.1. A council also has the power to exist perpetually, subject to unit 
owners' right· to terminate the condominium regime; to adopt and amend rules, 
regulations, and budgets and collect assessements for common expenses; to sue 
and be sued in its own name on matters affecting the condominium; to transact 
business; to make contracts, incur liabilities and borrow money, sell, mortgage, 
lease or otherwise dispose of any part of its assets; to purchase property; to hire 
and terminate employees; to invest and lend funds in furtherance of its operations; 
to regulate, maintain, cause improvements to be made to, or grant easements over 
or rent the common elements. I d. at 11-1 09( d). 
49. For examples of treatment of condominiums as personal property, see infra note 
86 and accompanying text. 
50. For a discussion of these amendments, see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying 
text. 
51. 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 ( 1983). The Staljish court applied the general war-
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trated the problems that commonly arise in condominium litigation 
with an added complexity: the liability of a non-builder real estate 
vendor for breach of construction warranties in a condominium that it 
had purchased at a foreclosure sale. The court's finding of liability on 
the part of this vendor is not restricted to condominium sales, but ap-
parently affects sales of all new residential realty. 
A. The Facts ofStarfi.sh 
In Starfish Condominium Association v. Yorkridge Service Corpora-
tion ,52 the Court of Appeals of Maryland was confronted with issues of 
a non-builder vendor's liability for breach of statutory warranties, an 
attempted disclaimer, and the standing of a council to sue for defects in 
the common elements. The original developer and builder of a thirty-
six unit apartment complex defaulted on his construction loans when 
the project was nearly complete. 53 A joint venture purchased the pro-
ject at public auction, with the intention of completing construction 
and imposing a condominium regime on the development. The joint 
venture, a general partnership, consisted of a local realtor and an in-
vestment corporation that was wholly owned by a corporate lender. 54 
According to plan, the project was completed and established as a con-
dominium in the spring of 1975, by which time all but one of the units 
had been sold. 55 
The council of unit owners and seventeen individual owners sued 
the joint venture for breach of statutory warranties arising from con-
struction defects in both the common elements and individual units. 
The trial court entered judgment against the council on its claim for 
defects in the common areas, but ruled in favor of the unit owners' 
claim for defects in their particular units.56 On appeal, the court of 
appeals unanimously held that the joint venture had incurred implied 
warranty obligations as a vendor of residential real estate under the 
Maryland statute57 and further, that its attempt to disclaim this liability 
was ineffective.58 By giving effect to a 1980 amendment to the Mary-
land Condominium Act, the Starfish court found that the council had 
ranty provisions of Mo. REAL PROPERTY ConE ANN.§ 10-203 (1981), rather than 
the warranties specifically applicable to sales of condominiums. The latter provi-
sion was enacted in 1980, after the sales which resulted in the Staljish litigation. 
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
52. 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1983). 
53. Id at 697, 458 A.2d at 807. At the time of default, the project was 70-85% 
complete. 
54. Id The council's and unit owners' claims against the realtor were voluntarily 
dismissed when he was adjudicated bankrupt. Id at 698-99, 458 A.2d at 808. 
55. Id at 697-98, 458 A.2d at 807-08. 
56. Id at 698, 458 A.2d at 808. 
57. Id at 702, 458 A.2d at 810 (citing MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.§§ 10-20l(e), 10-
203 (1981)). 
58. Staljish, 295 Md. at 702, 458 A.2d at 810. The sales contracts for the units con-
tained the following provision: "The unit and the appliances and fixtures con-
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standing to sue for defects in the common areas. 59 The court also held 
that any unit owner or fraction of all the unit owners was entitled to 
recover all of the damages for defects in the common elements by vir-
tue of his or their undivided interest as tenant[s) in common.60 
B. Liabrlity of Non-Traditional Builder- Vendors 
For purposes of warranty liability, Maryland has adopted the 
traditional concept of "vendor" in its statutory definition: "[A)ny per-
son engaged in the business of erecting or otherwise creating an im-
provement on realty, or to whom a completed improvement has been 
granted for resale in the course of his business."61 In Staifish, the joint 
venture challenged the applicability of this definition.62 As buyers at a 
foreclosure sale, they claimed to be the original purchasers and thus the 
beneficiaries rather than the warrantors under the statute. 63 The court 
found, however, that a purchaser protected by the statute is the pur-
chaser of a completed improvement.64 By taking the project prior to 
completion, completing construction, and selling the units, the joint 
venture was in fact a vendor.65 
In cases from other jurisdictions, sellers have used the definition of 
"vendor" to defend against actions for breach of implied warranty, as-
serting that they fail to fall within its reach.66 As in Staifish, however, 
these jurisdictions have interpreted "vendor" broadly. Although the 
term implies that a person be regularly engaged in the building busi-
ness, a history of building experience is not necessary.67 A first time 
builder is sufficiently "in the business" to impliedly warrant his work.68 
Furthermore, courts have held that the term includes the occasional 
builder69 and, under certain circumstances, the real estate agent. 70 The 
tained therein are sold 'as is' and . . . the seller is under no obligation to decorate, 
repaint, replace or repair any item or matter contained therein." Jd. 
59. Jd. at 703-08, 458 A.2d at 810-13. 
60. ld. at 707-08, 458 A.2d at 812-13. 
61. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § l0-210(e) (1981). 
62. Stalfish, 295 Md. at 699-701, 458 A.2d at 808. 
63. Jd. at 701, 458 A.2d at 809. 
64. ld. (construing MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § l0-20l(c) (1981)). 
65. Sta!fish, 295 Md. at 701, 458 A.2d at 809. 
66. See cases cited i'!fra notes 67-72. 
67. Mazurek v. Nielsen, 42 Colo. App. 386, 599 P.2d 269 (1979) (first-time builder 
who hired architect, contractor, and subcontractor to construct house was liable 
for breach of implied warranty of habitability when well failed); accord Sloat v. 
Matheny, 44 Colo. App. l, 605 P.2d 71 (1980), aff'd, 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981). 
68. ld. at 390, 599 P.2d at 271. 
69. E.g., McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979) (builder need not 
be in the business of mass producing homes to be liable for breach of warranty); 
accord Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (1981); Hodgson v. 
Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549, 403 A.2d 942 (1979). 
70. Capra v. Smith, 372 So. 2d 321 (Ala. 1979) (real estate agent was a vendor since 
she secured financing and the building site and was involved in drawing the plans 
for a house which was sold to a member of the public). 
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part-time builder who sells a house to a member of the public has been 
held a "vendor" even though he began construction with the intent of 
occupying the house himself.1 1 The question of liability for breach of 
implied warranty does not tum on the seller's business or profession, 
but on the commercial rather than casual nature of the sale. 72 
This flexible concept of "vendor" is consistent with the language of 
the Maryland statute, which includes not only those "engaged in the 
business of erecting or otherwise creating an improvement on realty," 
but also one to whom "a completed improvement has been granted for 
resale in the course of his business."73 This latter category presumably 
includes sellers who, although not liable by reason of their superior 
knowledge and skill, nonetheless are in a better position than the pur-
chaser to detect and prevent construction defects. This extension of the 
original policy considerations underlying warranty liability appears to 
focus more on the status of the parties than on the differences in their 
technological acumen. 
One group commonly involved in construction projects has largely 
escaped liability for breach of implied warranty. A construction lender 
does not incur warranty liability when a project it funded is found to be 
defective.74 This freedom from liability, however, is less certain when 
the lender forecloses on a defaulting borrower-contractor and acquires 
the property. By arranging for the completion and sale of the project, a 
lender may open itself to warranty liability.75 
Under the ULT A, the holder of a security interest in realty who 
forecloses, acquires, and resells the property does not become a vendor 
for warranty purposes.76 Whether Maryland would follow the ULTA 
71. Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981). But see Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 
2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976) (part-time contractor who built three houses with the 
intent of living in one of them and who sold it to a member of the public after 
living in it for one year was not liable as a commercial builder-vendor). 
72. Capra v. Smith, 372 So. 2d 321, 323 (Ala. 1979). 
73. Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.§ I0-20l(e) (1981). 
74. Walters v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 131 Ariz. 321,326,641 P.2d 235,239 
(1982); 1000 Grandview Ass'n v. Mt. Washington Assoc., 290 Pa. Super. 265, 268, 
434 A.2d 796, 798 (1981). But cf. Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 
2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (lender who became "active partici-
pant" in construction project was found liable in negligence when soil proved to 
be unsuitable for large-scale housing development). The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland found the Connor rationale inapplicable to the facts of Staifish. Star-
fish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 673, 719-20, 458 A.2d 
805, 819 (1983). 
75. Compare Smith v. Continental Bank, 130 Ariz. 320, 636 P.2d 98 (1981) (foreclos-
ing bank that was not in the business of constructing homes, did not perform the 
work, and did not warrant the construction, was not liable for breach of implied 
warranties merely because it arranged completion and sale of resid..:ntial develop-
ment) with Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors, 363 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1980) (foreclosing construction lender was liable for breaches of implied 
warranty arising from construction defects when it assumed title to the project, 
completed construction, and held itself out to the public as the developer). 
76. ULTA § 2-309(f), 13 U.L.A. 611 (1980). 
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posttlon is unclear after the Staifish decision. This issue was not 
squarely before the court of appeals in Staifish, and Maryland appel-
late courts have not confronted the question of a foreclosing lender's 
liability. The joint venture was not the original construction lender for 
the Starfish project, but rather an outside buyer at a foreclosure sale. It 
was, nonetheless, closer in nature to a foreclosing lender than a builder-
vendor. The joint venture was not regularly engaged in the business of 
constructing and selling homes, but was a corporate investor who 
bailed out a bankrupt project. The joint venture did not perform the 
construction work, but instead entered into an agreement with a second 
contractor for its completion. It had, however, taken title to the project, 
arranged for its completion, and perhaps most significantly, appeared 
to the public as if it were the developer. 
The joint venture was liable because the Staifish court determined 
it a vendor under Maryland law. The court of appeals rejected the 
joint venture's contention that it had not performed the actual work on 
the project. In holding that warranty liability is not dependent on the 
vendor actually having performed the warranted work, the Staifish 
court drew on the example of the general contractor who is liable for 
the work performed by a subcontractor.77 To recover damages for 
breach of statutory implied warranties, the court stated that a purchaser 
need only show the existence of a warranty, its breach, and the result-
ing damages. 78 
The Staifish decision leaves open the question of a foreclosing 
lender's liability for construction defects when it forecloses on an un-
completed project and, instead of reselling to a foreclosure buyer, ar-
ranges for the completion and sale of the project. While Maryland 
would probably follow the general rule that lenders are not liable for 
construction defects, a foreclosing lender faces some uncertainty as to 
how involved it may become in the completion of the project before 
incurring warranty liability. 
Recent changes in the Maryland Condominium Act (Condomin-
ium Act) may result in expanded liability for condominium vendors. 
In 1981, section 11-131 was added to the Real Property Code, provid-
ing that in addition to the warranties implied in the sale of all new 
residential realty, other warranties specifically applicable to condomin-
iums would be implied in the sale of all new or newly converted condo-
miniums. 79 These warranties run from a developer of a condominium 
77. Starfish, 295 Md. at 710, 458 A.2d at 814. 
78. ld 
79. 1981 Md. Laws 246 (current version at Mo. REAL PROP. CoDE ANN.§ ll-13l(b) 
( 1981 )). The new warranty provision implies the following warranties in the sale 
of a new or newly converted dwelling, which includes both the individual unit 
and its appurtenant interest in the common areas: 
(I) That the developer is responsible for correcting any defects in mater-
ials or workmanship in the construction of walls, ceilings, floors, and 
heating and air conditioning systems in the unit, and 
1984] Caveat Venditor 127 
project to the unit owners. 80 A developer under the Condominium Act 
is any person who subjects his property to a condominium regime,81 
that is, records a declaration, by-laws, and a condominium plat in the 
land records office of the county where the project is located. 82 This 
provision was not pertinent to the Staljish decision, as the 1981 amend-
ments were only applicable to condominiums for which a notice of in-
tent to create a condominium was filed after July 1, 1981.83 
The new section apparently does not embody the traditional con-
cept of builder-vendor, at least with regard to the disparity of skill and 
knowledge on which warranty liability was formerly premised. A de-
veloper of a condominium need not be in the business of constructing 
improvements to realty or acquiring them for resale as under the origi-
nal warranty provision. So long as the developer is responsible for es-
tablishing the condominium regime, he is liable for defects that come 
within section 10-203 and the new section ll-131 of the Real Property 
Code.84 His liability is therefore not premised on his superior knowl-
edge and skill, but clearly on his status as a seller of condominiums. 
This degree of liability is more closely analogous to the standard im-
posed on the nonmanufacturer-merchant of goods under the UCC than 
to traditional concepts of builder liability.85 Extending warranty liabil-
(2) That the heating and air conditioning systems have been installed in 
accordance with acceptable industry standards and: 
(i) That the heating system is warranted to maintain a 70°(F) tem-
perature with the outdoor temperature [at a level specified in the 
Energy Conservation Building Standards Act); and 
(ii) That the air conditioning system is warranted to maintain a 
78°(F) temperature inside with the outdoor temperature [at a 
level specified by the Energy Conservation Building Standards 
Act]; 
/d. Compare id (specificity of condominium warranties) with id § 10-203(a)(l)-
(4) (language of the general warranties implied in the sale of new improved real 
estate). 
80. In 1982, the General Assembly amended§ 11-131 to provide that the warranties 
on the common elements run directly from the developer to the council of unit 
owners. Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § ll-13l(c) (Supp. 1982). The implied 
warranties on the common elements apply to the roof, foundation, external sup-
porting walls, mech~cal, electrical, and plumbing systems and other structural 
elements. ld 
81. ld § 11-lOl(f). 
82. Id at§ 11-102. 
83. ld § ll-142(f); see StaifiSh, 295 Md. at 705-06 n.l, 458 A.2d at 812 n.l. It is clear 
that, had the new warranty provision been in effect, the joint venture would have 
been liable as a developer as it imposed the condominium regime on the project. 
ld at 697-98, 458 A.2d at 808. 
84. Section 11-131 states that its warranties are in addition to the warranties in § 10-
203. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.§ 11-13l{b) (1981). 
85. UCC § 2-314 (1978), applied in Sheesk.in v. Giant Food, 20 Md. App. 611, 629-30, 
318 A.2d 874, 885 (1976). In StaifiSh, the court of appeals stated that a vendor's 
liability under § 10-203 of the Real Property Code is analogous to a merchant's 
liability under UCC § 2-314. Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. 
Corp., 295 Md. 693, 710,458 A.2d 805,814 (1983). If so, then the court unneces-
sarily determined that the joint venture was responsible for at least some of the 
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ity to condominium developers who may not fit within a restrictive def-
inition of vendor is consistent with a tendency of courts and legislatures 
to treat condominiums as personal rather than real property.86 
In regard to the sale of goods, the General Assembly has been 
consumer-oriented, adopting a non-uniform amendment to Maryland's 
version of the UCC87 as well as a comprehensive Consumer Protection 
Act.88 Thus, when faced with a close question of liability in a condo-
minium sale, the court of appeals may place a heavier burden on a 
developer than on a vendor of non-condominium realty. 
C Attempted Disclaimers of Implied Warranties in Real Estate Sales 
The contracts for the sale of the condominium units in Staifish 
provided that the units themselves, the appliances, and the fixtures 
were sold "as is."89 In limited circumstances, this language can effec-
tively disclaim implied warranties in the sale of goods.90 Vendors have 
frequently employed this method of disclaiming warranties in real es-
tate transactions, with mixed results.91 After Staifish, however, it is 
construction on the project because a nonmanufacturing-merchant is liable for 
breach of implied warranty so long as he is in the chain of distribution. UCC § 2-
314(1978). 
86. See, e.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 128 N.J. Super. 385, 390, 320 A.2d 194, 
198 (1974) (vendor of condominium units not entitled to specific performance of 
sales contract because condominium units are not unique and "regardless of their 
realty label, share the same characteristics as personal property."); see also FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 718.203 (West 1976) (provides for implied warranties of mer-
chantability and .fitness in the sale of condominiums; these terms are generally 
associated with sales of goods). 
87. See Mo. CoM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 2-316.1 (Supp. 1983) (implied warranties can-
not be excluded or modified in the sale of consumer goods). See generally Free-
man & Dressel, Warranty Law in Maryland Product-Liability Cases: Stricl Liability 
Incognito, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 47 (1977) (comparing warranty liability under the 
Maryland commercial code to strict liability in tort). 
88. 1976 Md. Laws 907 (codified at Mo. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -501 
(1983)). 
89. Staifish, 295 Md. at 701-02, 458 A.2d at 810. 
90. UCC § 2-3l6(3)(a) (1978). Although this section provides that "all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults,' or other language 
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion," the 
judiciary has restricted the effectiveness of this method of disclaiming warranties. 
See Fairchild Indus. v. Maritime Air Serv., Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 190, 333 A.2d 313, 
318 (1975) (court imposed a conspicuousness requirement on disclaimers under 
§ 2-316(3)(a), because otherwise the section would be "contrary to the spirit of the 
U.C.C., and to the policy disfavoring exclusion of warranties.") 
91. Compare Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 
203 (1982) (presence of "as is" clause at the end of sales contract was sufficient 
evidence of agreement between the parties to assign the risk of defects to the pur-
chaser) and Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983) ("as is" clause included 
in listing, advertisements, and sales contract for house constituted an effective 
waiver of warranty rights) with Colsant v. Goldsmith, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 421 
N .E.2d l 073 ( 1981) ("as is" clauses that were in regular size type and included in 
standard form multi-page real estate contracts were ineffective since they did not 
meet the builder's burden of showing a conspicuous disclaimer that fully disclosed 
1984) Caveat Venditor 129 
clear that in Maryland the use of "as is" will not effectively disclaim 
warranties that are implied in real estate sales.92 The court held that an 
effective disclaimer must strictly comply with subsection 10-203(d), 
which requires a written, detailed instrument signed by the purchaser.93 
An "as is" clause, the Staifish court found, failed "to advise the pur-
chaser of the rights which the statute confers and which [he] is asked to 
waive."94 
Generally, while disclaimers of implied warranties have not been 
found to be against public policy, they have been strictly construed 
against builder-vendors. Vendors have the burden of showing a con-
spicuous provision that fully discloses the consequences of its inclu-
sion.95 The requirements of the Maryland disclaimer provision and its 
interpretation by the court of appeals attempt to ensure only knowing 
and intelligent waivers of warranty rights by residential purchasers. As 
a practical matter, vendors who attempt to comply with subsection 10-
203(d) may find that the mechanics of securing the purchaser's in-
formed waiver of warranty protection deters potential buyers. A sales 
contract that includes a separate, detailed disclaimer of warranties 
presents an unattractive and tenuous prospect to most home buyers. In 
any case, however, where it is not clear that a waiver of warranty rights 
was fully informed and consensual, or does not meet the formal re-
quirements of subsection 10-203(d), the waiver is likely to be found 
ineffective. 
IJ. Standing to Sue for Defects in the Common Areas 
In Maryland, all actions must generally be brought in the name of 
the real party in interest. 96 The joint venture in Staifish asserted that 
the council of unit owners was not the real party in interest as they held 
no property rights in the subject matter of the suit. Therefore, the joint 
venture reasoned, the council lacked standing to sue for the defects in 
the common elements.97 
its consequences) and Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310,415 
N.E.2d 1224 (1980) (same) and Tassan v. United Dev., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 
N.E.2d 902 (1980) (same). 
92. Starfish, 295 Md. at 702, 458 A.2d at 810. 
93. Mo. REAL PROP. CoDE ANN.§ 10-203(d) (1981) provides: 
(A]n implied warranty may be excluded or modified wholly or partially 
by a written instrument, signed by the purchaser, setting forth in detail 
the warranty to be excluded or modified, the consent of the purchaser to 
the exclusion or modification, and the terms of the new agreement with 
respect to it. 
94. Sta!fish, 295 Md. at 702, 458 A.2d at 810. 
95. See Co1sant v. Goldsmith, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073 (1981); Herlihy v. 
Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1980); Tassan v. 
United Dev., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980); accord Starfish Condo-
minium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1983). 
96. Mo. R.P. 203. Exceptions to this rule can be found in id 203(b). 
97. Starfish, 295 Md. at 703, 458 A.2d at 810-11. 
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Common elements of a condominium are held by the unit owners 
as tenants in common.98 Although the council is charged with the 
management of the common elements, it enjoys no property interest in 
them. As a general rule, in the absence of a statutory provision to the 
contrary, condominium associations lack standing to sue in a represen-
tative capacity at least with respect to property rights that are held by 
unit owners.99 Condominium councils in Maryland and elsewhere gen-
erally have the capacity to bring a legal action, but this is distinguished 
from the standing to sue as a real party in interest. 100 Former section 
11-109 of the Condominium Act, which conferred capacity to sue on 
the Staljish council, provided that a council had the power "to sue and 
be sued, complain and defend in any court." 101 
Courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted similar statutory lan-
guage in conjunction with other sections of their condominium acts 
that impose affirmative duties on the councils to maintain the common 
elements. Citing strong policy reasons to allow the councils to bring 
suit, these courts have construed their statutes to find that the councils 
are the proper parties to sue on matters affecting the common ele-
ments.10 The courts declared that denial of standing to the associa-
tions would result in a multiplicity of lawsuits, inconsistent 
adjudication of claims, and judicial waste, 103 and that the cost of estab-
lishing a case asserting damages in the common elements would dis-
courage individual litigants. 104 
In Maryland, questions of standing have been resolved by a 1980 
amendment to section 11-109, which gives condominium councils the 
statutory power to sue on behalf of themselves or two or more unit 
98. Mo. REAL PRoP. CODE ANN. § ll-107(a) (1981). 
99. Friendly Village Community Ass'n v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 
220, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973); Reibel v. Rolling Green Condominium A, Inc., 
311 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Rubenstein v. Burleigh House Inc., 305 
So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Commodore Plaza at Century 21 Condo-
minium Ass'n v. Saul J. Morgan Enters., 301 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
100. Whittington Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Braemer Corp., 313 So. 2d 463, 
466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Friendly Village Community Ass'n v. Silva & Hill 
Constr. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973). See generally Annot., 
69 A.L.R. 3d 1143 (1974) (discussing distinction between a condominium associa-
tion's capacity to sue and its standing to request relief for defects in the common 
elements). 
101. Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-109(d)(2) (1974) (current version at id § ll-
109(d)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1983)). 
102. See Wittington Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Braemar Corp., 313 So. 2d 463 
(Fla. App. 1975) (construing FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 711.12(2) (West 1969) (recodified 
atid § 718.lll (West 1976)); Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 93 N.J. 370,461 
A.2d 568 (1983) (construing N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 46:8B-15 {WEST 1970)). 
103. Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 93 N.J. 370, 379, 461 A.2d 568, 572-73 (1983); 
1000 Grandview Ass'n v. Mt. Washington Assocs., 290 Pa. Super. 365, 368, 434 
A.2d 796, 798 (1981). 
104. Raven's Cove Townhomes v. Knuppe Dev., liS Cal. App. 3d 783, 791, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 334, 338-39 (1981). 
1984) Caveat Venditor 131 
owners on matters affecting the condominium. 105 Although this 
amendment did ·not become effective until after the institution of the 
Staljish litigation, the court of appeals found that it could be applied to 
cure the procedural defect in the council's complaint. 106 Questions of a 
council's standing to sue for matters concerning the common elements 
have since been clarified by further legislative action. Section 11-131, 
which provides for implied warranties to unit owners, was amended in 
1981 to state that the warranties on the common elements run directly 
from the developer to the council of unit owners. 107 This section was 
again amended in 1982 to give the council the exclusive right to sue for 
breach of warranty in these areas. 108 The General Assembly appar-
ently recognized the practicality of allowing the council to represent the 
unit owners' interest in suits involving those areas for which it held all 
other responsibilities. 
E Quantum of Damages Recoverable for Difects in the Common 
Areas 
In Staljish, seventeen of the thirty-six individual unit owners 
joined the council to sue for breach of warranty arising from defects in 
the common areas. The court raised but rejected the argument that 
each owner was entitled only to one thirty-sixth of the total damage 
found to be present. 109 This question arose because of the nature of the 
individual's interest as a tenant in common holding an undivided per-
centage interest in the common areas. When less than all of the unit 
owners are parties to the suit, less than all of the ownership interests in 
the common elements are represented. Courts that have analyzed this 
issue have held, however, that any fraction of the unit owners are enti-
tled to recover all the damages proven to exist in the common elements. 
Developers have argued that awards that represent the percentage 
105. 1980 Md. Laws 681 (codified as Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § ll-109(d)(4) 
(1981)). This language is similar to that of a comparable provision of the UNIF. 
CONDOMINIMUM ACT§ 3-102(4), 7 U.L.A. 163 (Supp. 1984). 
106. The court stated: " 'Ordinarily a change affecting procedure only, and not sub-
stantive rights, made by statute applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or 
future.'" Staifish, 295 Md. at 705, 458 A.2d at 811 (quoting Richardson v. Rich-
ardson, 217 Md. 316, 320, 142 A.2d 550, 553 (1958)). 
107. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.§ ll-13l(c) (1981 & Supp. 1983). 
108. 1982 Md. Laws 836, § 3 (codified at MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.§ ll-13l(c)(4) 
(1982)). Actions for breach of warranty on the limited common elements can be 
brought by the council or the unit owners for whose use the areas are reserved. 
Jd Limited common elements are those identified in the declaration or condo-
minium plat as reserved for the exclusive use of one or more, but less than all of 
the unit owners. Jd § ll-10l(b)(l). 
109. Staifish, 295 Md. at 707, 458 A.2d at 812; see also Stony Ridge Hill v. Auerbach, 
64 Ohio App. 2d 40, 410 N.E.2d 782 (1979) (dismissing developer's claim that the 
non-party owners' interests should not be reflected in the award for damages 
caused by defective roof; each owner by statute held an undivided percentage 
interest in the common areas and a right to have roof repaired; id at 45, 410 
N .E.2d at 786). 
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interests of non-party unit owners would benefit subsequent purchasers 
who are not entitled to warranty protection. 110 Courts have held, how-
ever, that despite any advantage to subsequent purchasers, denying an 
entire award would deprive original purchasers of the benefit of their 
bargain. 111 Similarly, one court has held that so long as a single unit 
owner gives proper notice, a developer is liable for all of the defects in 
the common areas. 112 
In addition to compensatory damages, defects in the common ele-
ments may result in consequential damages to the individual condo-
minium unit. In Andrews v. City of Greenbelt, 113 the court of appeals 
held that an award for consequential damages may be justified when a 
portion of the common elements are taken by eminent domain. The 
Andrews court ostensibly based its decision on the language of subsec-
tion 11-112(c)114 of the Maryland Real Property Code. This subsec-
tion, however, does not expressly authorize this type of award. 
Subsection (1) provides for consequential damages to a unit owner "for 
the taking of all or part of his respective unit"; 115 subsection (3) provides 
that for a taking of the common elements, unit owners are entitled to a 
proportional award measured by their percentage interest. 116 
Despite the lack of express statutory authority, the Andrews deci-
sion awarding consequential damages to unit owners for damage to 
their respective units resulting from a taking of common elements is 
justified. The court reasoned that the individual interest in the unit and 
the joint interest in the common elements held by a unit owner consti-
tuted a single parcel of land because of the unity of ownership, use, and 
contiguity that exists between them. 117 Loss of, or damage to common 
elements is therefore also loss or damage to the unit. 
The general common elements are usually the last segment of a 
condominium project to be completed. 118 Sales are based on plans, 
110. Drexel Properties v. Bay Colony Club Condominiums, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); accord Juno by the Sea Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. 
Juno by the Sea Condominium Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
Ill. Drexel Properties v. Bay Colony Club Condominiums, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515,519 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); accord Staljish, 295 Md. at 707-08, 458 A.2d at 812-13. 
ll2. Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 592-93, 410 N.E.2d 902, 911-12 
(1980); accord Starfish, 295 Md. at 708, 458 A.2d at 812-13 (allowing the council 
to cure the procedural defect in its complaint did not deprive the joint venture of a 
substantive right, as any unit owner could have recovered all of the damages 
proven to exist in the common areas). 
113. 293 Md. 69, 441 A.2d 1064 (1982). 
ll4. Mo. REAL PRoP. CODE ANN.§ 1l-ll2(c) (1982); see Andrews, 293 Md. at 80, 441 
A.2d at 1071. 
115. Mo. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-ll2(c)(1) (1982) (emphasis supplied). 
116. /d § ll-l12(c)(3). 
ll7. Andrews, 293 Md. at 77-79, 441 A.2d at 1070-71. 
118. See Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors, 363 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980). See generally Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and 
Administration of Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FoREST 
L. REv. 915, 960-62 (1976) (size and complexity of condominium common ele-
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brochures, and developer's representations of the completed project. 
When a swimming pool or tennis court fails to materialize or the air 
conditioning is inadequate, the purchaser is denied the full benefit for 
which he bargained. Recognizing this, the Andrews court stated: "We 
have no difficulty in finding that there exists a 'unity of use' between a 
condominium's common elements and an individual's particular unit. 
The full enjoyment of this type of proprietorship would not be possible 
unless the unit owner had a right to utilize the common elements." 119 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has sanctioned an award of 
consequential damages to mitigate loss to the individual unit in the 
case of a taking of common elements by eminent domain, reasoning 
that this taking lessened the value of the unit to the owner. Construc-
tion defects in the common areas giving rise to breach of implied war-
ranty similarly lessen the value of a particular unit. Consequential 
damages should be recoverable when a breach of warranty damages 
the common areas of a condominium and depreciates the value of an 
owner's unit. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The law of warranties implied in sales of real property remains in 
its nascency, as does condominium law in general. In contrast, the law 
of warranties implied in the sale of goods is well developed and offers 
some guidance to real estate practitioners. Real estate law will con-
tinue to follow the lead of personal property law as mass production 
and marketing of housing causes the distinctions between the two to 
become less significant. In Maryland, vendors of residential housing, 
condominium and otherwise, will be held to statutory standards of per-
formance analogous to that of a merchant under the UCC. Liability 
will be premised on the seller's status rather than his participation in 
the actual construction of the dwelling. Disclaimers of warranty liabil-
ity have been disfavored and will be found ineffective if not in strict 
compliance with section 10-203(d) of the Real Property Code. 
Recent amendments to the Maryland Condominium Act have ex-
panded the potential liability of condominium developers beyond that 
of vendors of other real estate. The new condominium warranties are 
far more specific than the original warranty provisions of the Real 
Property Code, indicating a legislative protectionism for condominium 
purchasers. Condominium councils are now the direct beneficiaries of 
warranties on the common areas, increasing the likelihood that more of 
these suits will be brought. Developers should consider the consumer-
oriented approach that the General Assembly and Maryland courts 
ments, along with the common construction practice of completing these areas 
after beginning unit sales, require enforcement of warranty liability for defects in 
those areas). 
119. Andrews, 293 Md. at 79, 441 A.2d at 1070. 
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have taken in regard to sale of consumer goods for it is likely that they 
will be held to a similar standard. 
Linda Semesky Woolf 
